Re: RFID Flap Silences Security Researchers

["Bill Kearney" <wkearney-99@hot-mail-com>]

> There's another reason that thieves don't go
> around toting key blanks.  They don't open
> anything.

Not the blanks, duh, that cutting a significantly large enough quantity of
them to be useful would be impractical.  As opposed to the negligible
difference between one RFID cloned key and a billion of them.

> It's not that easy.  Any decent system
> will initiate a lockout timer after three or
> four consecutive bad RFID codes.

> Perhaps in cheap systems there's no
> method but in many access control systems
> there is.

In a residential setting it's considerably less likely.  Thus the uptake of
RFID for residential settings presents an interesting target for greater
abuse.

I'm not arguing one against the other; mechanical keys vs RFID.  More that
implementing things like RFID into a residential setting has considerably
more possible problems than existing solutions effectively handle; in a
*residential* setting.  Thus the silencing of potential risks because of the
defects in the technology IS a troubling problem.  Security through
obscurity is worthless.