Re: RFID Flap Silences Security Researchers

["Robert L Bass" <no-sales-spam@bassburglaralarms>]

> Ideally the system should use a zero
> knowledge proof...

I don't get your meaning.  Please elaborate.

> Rolling codes are a clever hack to get
> some security in a one-way environment, but
> there is really no need to resort to them here.

They add another layer in front of the would-be
hacker.

> | In fact, a residential system often requires
> | more features and flexibility than a
> | conmmercial one.
>
> Absolutely.  I wish more folks in the industry
> realized this...

I know a few who do.  Most believe precisely the
opposite is true.  A few points.  Commercial
systems usually only require two states -- armed
and disarmed.  Residential systems can be
disarmed, armed "away", armed "at home awake"
or armed "at home asleep."  While away every
sensor should be active.  While at home awake
perimeter sensors are on and the entry door(s)
may be instant or delay armed.  Motion sensors
are off.  While asleep everything except bedroom
and perhaps certain common area motion
detectors will be armed.  Doors will be armed
instant.

In a commercial alarm system there may or may
not be a panic or holdup function, but in a home
there should always be a means of summoning
help.

As you alluded earlier, a commercial alarm
system primarily protects "stuff" but a residential
alarm primarily protects people.  The emphasis
is an important factor in designing the schedule
of protection.

> | Even without a 2-way "conversation" the system
> | will always know that someone is trying to
> | access it...
>
> I was responding to the previous poster's
> unrealistic scenario of millions of RFID
> devices wandering past the door daily.
> Nevertheless...

OK.  We're on the same page.

> | True but it's actually simpler than that.  Since
> | the range is limited, any received transmission
> | of the same protocol could be treated as an
> | attempt.
>
> This still leaves you open to denial of service
> attacks.  Not a big problem now, you may say
> (as likely thought the developers of tcp/ip about
> SYN floods), but why set yourself up for trouble
> if you don't have to?...

Agreed.  There's always a compromise between
security and convenience.  The safer we make the
system from hacking the easier it becomes for
someone to hassle us.  Fortunately, a DOS
attack using RFID would be more of a pain for
the attacker than the attackee.  This goes back
to the short range of RFID cards.  In order to
trigger a lockout the hacker would need to be
very close to the reader.  A brief lockout (say 30
seconds after three or four failed attempts) will
have negligible impact on authorized users but
will greatly impede the individual trying to use
random or sequential codes to break in.

> We should all take a lesson from the "broken
> is good enough" design philosophy perfected
> by the WEP committee...

An apt description if ever there was one.  :^)

--

Regards,
Robert L Bass

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