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Re: NFPA's Creation of Security Standards/Codes
Al Colombo said:
>I would like to hear from those who are interested in the issue of NFPA
>(National Fire Protection Association) and the creation of security
>standards/codes: NFPA 730 and NFPA 731.
>
>I'm especially interested in whether you believe a codified standard
>consisting of protective mandates and installation practices is in the
>best interest of the client and the security industry in general.
If you've read the NFPA proposals, you'll understand the flaw. These
idiots are assuming you can apply fire alarm principles to burglar alarms
and thereby solve all the industry's problems. They want plans and
permits. They want inspections. They want third party certification. And
all this shows is a fundamental lack of understanding of the difference
between burglar and fire alarms.
The main purpose of regular fire alarm inspections is to help assure that
the system will operate when needed. Fire alarm systems just sit there
most of the time, and if they fail, the severe form of failure is not to
operate at all. If that happens, people may die. Yes, there are false
fire alarms, but when those false alarms occur, it is likely to be due to
something that can be detected during an inspection -- dirty smoke
detectors, defective retards on a waterflow switch, and so on.
I can inspect the hell out of a burglar alarm system today, and I cannot
guarantee you that it absolutely will not cause a false alarm tonight.
If the NFPA is concerned about workmanship standards, then UL has already
done that: UL 681 has been around for about 80 years now. If the NFPA is
concerned about extents of protection, UL has addressed that too. If the
NFPA is concerned about assuring the effectiveness of alarm systems through
third party certification, they need to understand that UL spends maybe one
day a year with each listed company -- and does nothing more than a visual
inspection of a handful of certificated systems. Ultimately, the
reliability and effectiveness of the systems depends on the skill and
dedication of the installing company, and standards, inspections, and
certifications will do nothing to improve that.
This is all about making money. Your customer will be paying for you to
draw up plans for a strip-mall store's burglar alarm. Your customer will
then pay the cost of an inspection. You will charge a UL certificate fee,
and you'll pay UL about $1500 a year for the privilege. If your customer
remodels his store, you get to do it all over again. Will you need to take
out a permit to add a door, or replace a defective motion detector?
And what, exactly, will be the benefit from doing all of this? The
insurance industry has long since lost interest in UL certificates for
purposes of insurance discounts. They require certificates for a small
number of high risk customers, but the numbers are way down from years gone
by. False alarm reduction? Nonsense. And the best proof of this is to
look at the British model.
For many years, England has had detailed national standards for burglar
alarm systems, standards that cover both installation and maintenance. All
monitored systems must receive an inspection twice a year. Police only
respond to alarms installed by companies that have been approved by the
individual police department, and are approved by a national inspection
body. Those companies issue a certification for each and every system they
install, stating that it has been installed in accordance with British
standards and is receiving those semiannual inspections.
And what has been the result of all this regulation? The false alarm rate
per system was substantially the same as that in the United States. What
finally did lead to a dramatic reduction in false alarms was a ruthless
system of false alarm quotas imposed by the police, plus requirements for
some form of alarm verification. Excessive false alarms from an account
leads to termination of police response. Excessive false alarms from an
installing company leads to a refusal by the police to issue any new alarm
permits for that company. And none of this requires the submission of
plans or field inspections by city officials or the police.
The NFPA's approach is a money-making plan for the NFPA and the cities and
UL. It will not result in a reduction in false alarms, and any improvement
in the detection capabilities of alarm systems will be impossible to
measure. Plus, the insurance industry could care less about all of this.
The NFPA is an anal-retentive organization that believes that all the
world's problems will cease to exist if only there are a few more codes and
standards for people to follow. Look at how the size of the fire alarm
standards have increased over the last twenty-five years, and think how big
they will be in another hundred years, as the NFPA seeks to regulate every
last detail of our industry.
It particularly offends me that NFPA members aren't even allowed to vote on
proposals like this unless they make the pilgrimage to the convention to
vote in person.
- badenov
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