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RE: Re: OT: Terrorism


  • To: <ukha_d@xxxxxxx>
  • Subject: RE: Re: OT: Terrorism
  • From: "Graham Howe" <graham@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2001 00:11:26 +0100
  • Delivered-to: mailing list ukha_d@xxxxxxx
  • Mailing-list: list ukha_d@xxxxxxx; contact ukha_d-owner@xxxxxxx
  • Reply-to: ukha_d@xxxxxxx

> > Well I can see we are not going to agree here Mark.
>
> Quite possibly :)
>
> > The fact is that
> > thousands have died
> > who would still be alive today if the flight decks had
> > been secured.
> > The technology does exist and is reliable to secure
> > the flight
> > deck without causing any other risks to normal flight and
> only a minor
> > inconvenience.
>
> But every passenger and crew member would probably have died.
> It is better
> to save everybody than to try and value some lives over others. Your
> solution for reasons I mention later does not guarantee
> anybody's safety but
> does pretty much ensure a death sentence to those not
> "protected" by the
> locked door.
>
If it was commonly known that it would not be possible to enter the flight
deck during flight then what would be the point in killing the passengers,
regardless of the atrocities committed on the plane, nothing would persuade
the crew to fly into a building rather than the ground. Of course it is
better to save everybody and I am not valuing some over others, but it is
true that it is better to lose hundreds than thousands.

> It is not fact that a locked flight deck would have changed
> anything. Until
> the details surrounding the hijacks are known, it is
> unreasonable to assert
> that a locked flight deck would have changed anything. For
> all we know, the
> flight deck could have been locked when the hijack began as
> is standard
> procedure on many flights today. Assuming it was locked, it
> is in the first
> instance the unlocking of the door which undermines this
> assertion that a
> locked door would stop anything.
>
But what I have been talking about is something that prevents the door from
being opened during flight, this would have prevented them from gaining the
controls.

> A locked door is after all merely a locked door and not
> undefeatable. Given
> the determination and dedication of the hijackers and their
> complete defeat
> of whatever security was at the airport, I doubt a locked
> door would have
> been a great hurdle for them.
>
It depends upon the type of door, I'm pretty sure that something could be
developed which would withstand even the most fervent penknife attack
whilst
the plane was landed or diverted.

> Using your own example of the security of money, I direct you
> look into how
> these systems are defeated. It is rare, but more common than aeroplane
> hijacks which shows that even the incredible security to
> safeguard money is
> not completely secure.
>
In my experience there has only been one defeat of security in the cash
centres and that was because of an insider letting the crooks in. Like I
said, short of explosives they could not force their way in.

> Finally, there is the obvious change in direction that any mythical
> undefeatable locked door would create such as the flight crew
> itself being
> the "hijackers".
>
Agreed, though your increased airport security wouldn't do much in those
circumstances either!

> So hopefully even if we disagree, you can follow the reasons
> I do not see
> any advantage whatsoever with the locked flight deck. It doesn't fix
> anything. The problem remains. The risk remains. Safety is
> not increased.
> The loss of that limited freedom to view to cockpit on request and
> acceptance by the captain, is merely an ancillary action, but is an
> unnecessary restriction without advantage.
>
As I have just explained I see an advantage in preventing in flight access
to the flight deck for non-flight crew persons. I accept that this will not
protect against the bogus flight crew but I do not accept that any door can
be defeated by hijackers without something a bit more serious than knives.

> > I agree that the terrorists and their plot should have been
> > identified before they even got on the planes, but they weren't.
>
> No, and this is something that is simple and cheap to
> address. The systems
> already exist and are already in place. They ensure the
> safety of everybody
> on the aircraft and anyone in any potential flight path. This
> failure along
> with some concerns I have wrt the actions of ATC and other
> aviation services
> must be addressed and immediately. Again the ATC thing is
> something I will
> avoid rather than discuss at length right now.
>
Yes we certainly agree on this point, something bad went wrong with the
intelligence, hijack warning system and airport security.....but what will
prevent it going wrong again. Seat belts would not be required if people
stopped crashing their cars. I can see problems occurring on an aircraft
with unauthorised people getting on to the flight deck regardless of any
precautions taken on the ground. Again we are back to your prevention
rather
than cure, ATC action is surely part of the cure, it only comes into play
when problems are already occurring.

> > You don't
> > want to see measures introduced to prevent such actions in
> future, I do.
>
> Not what I said. It is the degree of measures that concerns me since
> anything implemented in direct response to this is to some degree an
> admission of weakness. Concentrating on this one off event as
> a long term
> solution also still leaves open all other avenues for
> terrorist activity
> which will not be prioritised if we are spending all our time
> and efforts
> concentrating on this one tactic.
>
There were weaknesses, we don't have to admit them, they are all over the
news and will be for weeks and months to come. We are vulnerable to
terrorists attacks, what is wrong with protecting ourselves?

> Treating the effect will not fix the problem. Removing the cause will.
>
How exactly are we going to remove the cause of terrorism, a Nobel peace
price awaits your answer!

> The type of measures taken must be effective, appropriate and
> as unobtrusive
> as possible to our everyday life. As I said in a previous
> email, where would
> you draw the line, since I guess the most "secure"
> environment we have known
> was kind of undermined when the USSR collapsed :)
>
Where to draw the line is a difficult question, but like I said, I see an
aircraft as a particularly attractive and high profile target, so why not
start with those.

> > I
> > also support the removal of litter bins from the underground,
>
> Actually I only half support this since the removal of litter
> bins has lead
> to a litter problem and therefore a fire risk. This I would compare to
> locking the flight deck. It did not really address the actual
> problem merely
> removed a perceived problem. The possibility of "secure"
> litter bins was
> ignored but would have been more effective and avoided the
> ongoing problem.
>
Agreed, the is a litter problem though I'm not sure how much of a fire risk
it is as litter seems to be cleared very regularly. I also remember many
overflowing bins before they were removed. I must admit that I thought the
idea of secure bins was scrapped as being unworkable rather than just being
ignored, but I can't really remember. If removing litter bins contributes
to
an increased fire risk, then I don't see how it is comparable to a locked
flight deck which does not increase risk.

> > the
> > compulsory
> > use of seat belts, crash helmets on motorbikes and various
> other invasions
> > of my 'rights' in return for safety.
>
> Seat belts are proven to reduce injury and death in accidents, as with
> motorcycle helmets. Locking doors on aeroplanes is not proven
> to assist in
> safety and I see a number of ways in which it removes safety
> while it would
> be relatively easy to defeat.
>
I don't see a reduction in safety with locked doors, I do see an increase
in
safety and I don't see that they have to be easy to defeat at all.

> > You state that there are much better
> > ways to prevent future occurrences, what are they?
>
> See below.
>
> > And finally the
> > terrorists DID defeat aip*plane* security, they got control
> of the flight
> > deck,
>
> Eventually but this is more effect than cause...
>
Effect of plane hijack was nothing until controls were seized, I can not
believe that any pilot would choose to fly into a building. Therefore the
cause of the planes hitting the buildings must have been loss of control of
the flight deck, airplane security.

> > they also defeated air*port* security by carrying (basic) weapons
on
> > board.
>
> Which is the root of the problem. Without the weapons, the
> planes would
> likely have remained under the captain's control. I played with simple
> sensors at university (and cheap given the Uni paid for them)
> which when
> added to current detection mechanisms would be more effective
> at spotting
> certain potential weapons. However, improving the current
> systems might not
> be required, just using the existing ones would have gone a great way
> towards preventing this.
>
If the weapons were as small as penknives then I'm not so sure, but I agree
that they should have been detected. Also the seem to be plenty of metal
knives and forks in club class which could be acquired quite easily.

> > However I would assume that a person skilled in unarmed
> > combat would
> > be a serious threat on a plane without any actual weapon so there
> > has to be
> > security on board in my view.
>
> Fine, put security staff on board. I could live with that. It
> would also be
> of assistance to the flight crew in the event of problem
> passengers which
> currently the flight crew have to deal with. We have security
> officers in
> airports and often at train and tube stations. Put a couple
> qualified guys
> on board the aircraft permanently that are purely there to protect and
> assist.
>
Yes, good idea, though of course they would need to be there in sufficient
numbers to defeat the hijackers. One single passenger 57 is not going to be
much use.

> The terrorists appeared to be working in groups of 3-6 and
> armed, not merely
> relying on any unarmed combat skill. A solitary person taking
> a plane purely
> with unarmed combat is quite unlikely given the restrictive
> space. Weapons
> are much better tools for the confined space of an aircraft and as a
> deterrent against "would be heroes". These weapons could
> actually have been
> carried onto the plane legally (if under 4" IIRC) even if
security had
> checked for them!
>
I agree one unarmed man is not much of a threat, but a few might be,
especially if they equip themselves from the galley once on board.

> The failure at the airport is what allowed this to happen.
> The low level of
> security on planes is often due to the amount of security and
> screening at
> the airport. The failure was largely due to it being a
> domestic flight,
> however I would have thought that interstate (or
> transcontinental) would
> have been subject to more stringent security checks than
> intra state but
> this was not the case.
>
No argument here, security must be increased, but as we have both stated,
it
would still be possible for small weapons to be smuggled on board or
acquired once inside the aircraft.

> Mark.
>
> P.S. While about to send this email, I just heard on Sky News
> that "plain
> clothes" security will be on board all aircraft and that
> security checks for
> internal flights will be made. Also knives are now banned.
> There are also a
> number of other airport security measure which *should* have
> always been in
> place, now being implemented in order to reopen US airspace.
> AFAIK, locked flight decks has not been mentioned.
>
This is all good news, I hope it really happens and I hope it means we
don't
ever need locked flight decks. But I really don't want to find out that
despite these new measures we end up needing locked flight decks!

Graham



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